For instance, the New Hampshire Supreme Court, at Pro Done, was „seized of a question of first impression for this court: whether New Hampshire law recognizes a plea of infringement based on an obligation not to bring legal action if the contract does not expressly provide that the non-injurious party is entitled to consequential damages for breach of the agreement.“  The settlement agreement at issue in Pro Done included both an authorization and an obligation not to sue a company and certain related persons with respect to certain identified claims. Nevertheless, the parties who granted the authorization and who undertook not to bring any subsequent actions sued some of the beneficiaries of the authorization and undertook not to bring proceedings against claims under the settlement agreement. However, the defendants argued that the award of recovery of Ligurian costs in damages for infringement was contrary to the so-called „American Rule“, which states that, in the absence of a specific provision of the contract or applicable law, the parties bear their own procedural costs to assert their contractual and other rights. But the court also rejected this argument, because „unlike defendants in other types of legal proceedings, a defendant loses the benefit of the agreement without recourse when it is forbidden to bring an infringement action against a party who has violated an explicit term of the contract.“  In other words, unlike the typical infringement action to which the U.S. rule applies when one party seeks damages for breach of the other party`s performance, attorneys` fees and court costs are the measure of the actual harm caused by the breach of the promised performance under an obligation not to bring legal action, and not the costs, which result from the pursuit of damages in favor of the operation on the basis of the breach of another promised service. A peace-free covenant was originally conceived as a means of avoiding the harshness of a common law doctrine, which found that a release not only fulfills the obligation of the institution itself. Therefore, if you have settled a claim with one of the many complicit debtors and you have granted an release to that debtor, you are effectively free of all the obligation and your right to sue the other complicit debtors for the remaining amount of the obligation that has not been paid by the debtor. However, if, instead of granting an exemption to the debtor, you entered into a contract with that debtor in which you agreed not to sue the debtor over the obligation, you avoided the rule that treated an exemption as the fulfillment of the entire undertaking. . . .